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I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, the typical pro-environment lawsuit has been filed
by an environmental nongovernmental organization ("NGO") on
behalf of a neighbor or hiker.1 The NGO would allege that the
individual faced health risks, that her property was contaminated,
or that she could no longer hike, fish, swim, or view wildlife such
as the endangered Nile crocodile, as in the well-known case of
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 2 The NGO accordingly would
*
Joseph L. Sax Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I
am very grateful to Florida State University College of Law for the invitation to give the
Distinguished Environmental Lecture on which this essay is based, as well as for the
helpful questions from the audience. I also appreciate the valuable comments and feedback
from Eric Biber, Dan Farber, Shi-Ling Hsu, Riyaz Kanji, David Markell, Mark Seidenfeld,
and participants in the Berkeley Law School Environmental Law Colloquium. Finally, I
have received very generous research support from University of Michigan Law School Cook
and Elkes Funds. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ [https://perma.cc/CY5D-RRAB].
1. E.g., James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Environmental Citizen Suit Trends, 33
Env. L. Rept. 10704 (2003) ("Early on, environmental groups brought nearly all citizen
suits. [As of 2003], one in three citizen suits are brought by nontraditional citizens,
including companies, landowners, developers, industry, and ever more frequently, states
and faith-based organizations. ' ) Citizen suits filed by nongovernmental organizations
continue to be a mainstay.
2. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). In that case, the NGO, on behalf of the individuals,
challenged the government's rule interpreting the Endangered Species Act not to apply
extraterritorially. Id. at 557-58. The case famously foundered on the shoals of standing
doctrine. Although the individuals had previously visited the habitats of the endangered
Nile crocodile and the Asian leopard, the Court found they had inadequately concrete future
travel plans to demonstrate the concrete and imminent injury-in-fact required for standing.
Id. at 563-64. The Court also rejected standing for individuals who studied or cared for the
animals in other parts of the world. Id. at 565-67.
Many other well-known environmental law suits fit the same mold of an NGO
representing an injured member. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs: A
Court Construes the National Environmental Policy Act to Create a Powerful Cause of
Action, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 77, 90 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds.,
2005) (noting that the Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee in the landmark case of
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm., 449 F.2d
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challenge private conduct or government action. Legal advocacy by
NGOs on behalf of their members remains critical to
environmental protection and to holding government and
corporations accountable under the environmental laws. 3 Such
lawsuits have been especially important given decades of
congressional dysfunction on environmental issues and wild
swings in executive branch environmental policy. But in the last
several years, distinctive sets of plaintiffs have begun to emerge:
Tribes, cities, and children.
These developments were foreshadowed by the State of
Massachusetts' 2007 litigation in the Supreme Court. In
Massachusetts v. EPA,4 the State of Massachusetts led the
challenge to EPA's denial of a Clean Air Act petition that it
regulate greenhouse gases from new cars. The original petition
had been filed by a group of environmental NGOs, but by the time
litigation began, the State of Massachusetts had taken over the
case. 5 The lead plaintiff in challenging EPA's petition denial was
neither an individual, a corporation, nor a nongovernmental
organization, but instead a democratically elected government
with its own constituency of close to seven million people and an
entire congressional delegation to represent its interests in the
6
political arena.
Massachusetts famously won the case, persuading the Court
that EPA had improperly rejected the petition. Massachusetts
convinced the Court not only that it had standing owing to its
potential loss of coastal property to rising seas, but that
greenhouse gases are Clean Air Act "air pollutants" and that
EPA's petition denial should be set aside.7
Justice Stevens,
writing for a majority of the Court, emphasized that a State's

1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) was selected as plaintiff because organizational members had homes
on Maryland's western shore); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (case
brought by NGO on behalf of hiker-members).
3.
E.g., Sara Mogharabi, Dacia Meng, Anthony Papetti, Zaheer Tajani,
Environmental Citizen Suits in the Trump Era, 32 Nat. Res. & Envt. 3 (Fall 2017) (noting
that increased fundraising for environmental nongovernmental organizations "will support
an expansion of citizen suits").
4.
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
5.
Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change in the Supreme Court, 38 ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (2008)
(International Center for Technology Assessment led the petition to EPA to regulate
greenhouse gases from new cars in 1999; "the largest and most established environmental
organizations did not join the initial petition.").
6.
Heinzerling, who represented the State of Massachusetts, has argued that relying
on injury to a more typical environmental plaintiff, an Alaskan hiker, would have been a
mistake. Heinzerling, supra note 5, at 14 (arguing that if plaintiffs had relied on the hiker's
allegations to establish injury, they "would just be hosed in the Supreme Court.").
7.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-35 (2007).
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claim to standing, given its quasi-sovereign interests and limited
ability to protect its own environment, would be considered with
"special solicitude."8
Massachusetts' victory over EPA in the Supreme Court has
invigorated the engagement of States with the federal government
in court. We've now seen numerous challenges to federal action
challenges to
brought by State governments, including
environmental rules, 9 Obama-era policies to "defer action" under
immigration laws against so-called "Dreamers,"-illegal aliens
who came to* the United States as children' 0 -and the so-called
"travel bans" of the Trump era.1 '
Beyond States, however, three new sets of plaintiffs have
become increasingly visible in environmental litigation. Tribes,
cities, and children have been acting as plaintiffs and taking their
environmental claims to court. Like the State of Massachusetts,
Tribal and municipal governments are in court in these cases on
behalf of democratically constituted communities. Children are
also in court attempting to speak for themselves and their
generation, as well as for future generations. 12 In my view, we
should welcome these emerging voices in litigation. These relative
newcomers are not only trying to use lawsuits to protect their
communities, but, as representative groups, are contributing
importantly to our public dialogue on environmental policy, both
inside and outside the courts. Section II of this essay discusses
recent environmental litigation brought by these plaintiffs.
Section III assesses normative issues presented by these lawsuits.
Section IV briefly concludes.
II. THE PLAINTIFFS
A. Tribes
Over 500 federally recognized Native American Tribes reside
within the borders of the United States.1 3 Tribes possess formal
sovereignty, though like States, they are internal to the United

8.
9.
regulate
10.

Id. at 520.
E.g., id.; Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (challenging EPA decision to
power plant mercury emissions).
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an equally divided

court, 136 S.Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
11. E.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a
State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (2016).
12. Tim Stelloh, Kids' climate change lawsuit against federal government can proceed
without naming Thump, judge rules, NBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018, 8:06 PM).
13.

TRIBAL NATIONS & THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION, http://www.ncai.org/

about-tribes (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
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States. Both because of that and as a result of congressional
action, their governmental powers have been significantly
limited.14
Tribes have long sought to enforce the treaties under which
they relinquished their claims to vast portions of their
homelands. 15 But in recent years, we have seen Tribal litigators
turn their attention more specifically to environmental protection,
recognizing how critical environmental quality is for the welfare
and well-being of Tribal communities.
Consider the 2008 suit brought by the Native Village of
Kivalina, Alaska, a federally recognized Tribe of Inupiat
Eskimos. 16 The village is a small one that has been located within
the Arctic Circle since time immemorial. It lies at the end of a
roughly six mile barrier island, and its survival is threatened by
climate change, since the sea ice on the coastline that has
protected the village from sea storms is forming later and has been
17
thinner and less extensive in nature.
The Native Village filed one of the earliest public nuisance
suits against energy producers. They sought damages on the
theory that unrestricted fossil fuel emissions from the major oil
companies they named as defendants have contributed to the
existential threat facing the Native Village. 18
The Village was ultimately unsuccessful, but its suit
nonetheless was one of the earliest to bring attention to specific,
concrete human losses from climate-caused environmental
damage. The Native Village of Kivalina's imminent need for
relocation has become a leading indicator of what the world is
facing from climate change. 19
14. E.g., Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2016) ("[U]nless and
until Congress withdraws a tribal power.., the Indian community retains that [sovereign]
authority in its earliest form."); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS § 21(Am.

Law. Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2018) ("Indian tribes are domestic nations possessing the
powers of a limited sovereignty subject to modification by Congress.").
15. E.g., Washington v. Washington State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979); Dennis J. Donohue, New Mining Projects in Michigan: Opportunities &
Obstacles, 93 MICH. B.J. 22 (2014).
16. See generally Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863,
868 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff'd, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
17. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012)
("If the village is not relocated, it may soon cease to exist.").
18. Id.
19. E.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Obama Takes Climate Message to Alaska, Where
Change is Rapid, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com2015/09/03/
us/politics/obama-takes-climate-message-to-alaska-where-changeis-rapid-in-aaska.html.
Even earlier, bands of the Cherokee Indian Nation tried unsuccessfully to halt the Tellico
Dam in Tennessee after Congress overrode the Supreme Court's famous decision in
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) and specifically funded the dam. Two
bands of the Nation and three individual Cherokee Indians argued that the dam would flood
their "sacred homeland," destroying sacred sites, flooding graves, and impacting the
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In 2016, the Standing Rock Sioux and the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe brought suit over the federal government's
authorization of the Dakota Access Pipeline crossing under Lake
Oahe, which forms part of the Missouri River. These areas of the
Missouri River have long been sacred to the Tribes. They supply
water for drinking, irrigation, and ritual needs. The Tribes alleged
that construction of the pipeline itself desecrated sites important
to the Tribe. 20 The Tribes also claimed that the government
violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to
perform a full analysis of the pipeline's environmental impacts
prior to authorizing the crossing; the district judge agreed,
requiring the government to more fully assess impacts to
environmental resources implicated by the Tribe's hunting and
21
fishing rights.
And five Tribes, led by the Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation,
are in court challenging the 2017 Trump Administration order to
substantially reduce the recently-declared Utah Bears Ears
National Monument, a spectacular stretch of red rock canyons
dotted with historic and sacred Native American sites. 22 The
complaint alleges that the Tribes rely on Bears Ears to collect
"plants, minerals, objects, and water for religious and cultural
ceremonies and medicinal purposes; hunt, fish, and gather... and
conduct ceremonies on the land." 23 The ordered reduction is
understood to effectively open the lands to uranium mining and
other uses.
In both the pipeline and national monument litigations, the
Tribes are arguing for expanded notions of environmental values.

plaintiffs' culture and history. The Sixth Circuit reasoned, however, that the plaintiffs had
not adequately demonstrated the centrality of the area to their religious observances, and
refused a preliminary injunction against the flooding. See Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 629 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
20. See, e.g., Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp. 3d
77 (D.D.C. 2017) (rejecting arguments under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and
summarizing arguments regarding pipeline route), appeal dismissed, 2017 WL 4071136
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
21. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101,
131, 133-34 (D.D.C. 2017) (agreeing that the government failed to adequately consider
impacts to environmental resources implicated by the Tribe's fishing and hunting rights,
though declining to require further analysis of potential "existential" meaning of such
resources).
22. See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Hopi Tribe v. Trump,
No. 1:17-cv-02590 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 4, 2017). As of March, 2019, a motion to dismiss the
case is pending in the district court. See generally Briefs on Federal Motion to Dismiss in
Bears Ears Litigation, Turtle Talk, Nov. 20, 2018, https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2018/
11/20/briefs-on-federal-motion-to-dismiss-in-bears-ears-litigation/.
23. See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 244, Hopi Tribe v. Trump,
No. 1:17-cv-02590 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 4, 2017); id. 4 ("Bears Ears is so culturally and
spiritually significant that some ceremonies use items that can only be harvested from
Bears Ears.").
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They are identifying impacts on land, the purity of water in nearby
waterbodies, sacred sites, historic sites, and ancestral lands; they
are also alleging harm to the ability of Tribal members to "engage
in rituals and ceremonies around sacred sites." 24 In short, Tribes
are calling on the courts to think more broadly about the costs of
environmental degradation, including to community identification
and individual emotional well-being.
Finally, in the early 2000s, twenty-one Pacific Northwest
Tribes, together with the United States, sued to enforce treaty
salmon fishing rights. The Tribes depend on the fisheries both for
subsistence and to earn a living. The point of the suit, however,
was to establish that the treaty rights also legally obligate
Washington State to remove culverts under state roads that
25
obstruct salmon passage to spawning grounds.
The Tribes obtained a forceful opinion in the Ninth Circuit in
2017 which was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court.
The hope is that implementation of the decree will help stem a
dramatic decline in the salmon population in the Puget Sound and
its tributaries. The Tribes were successful in convincing the courts
that treaty rights should be more expansively understood to
encompass habitat protection as essential to the fishing resource.
As with any litigation effort, only some Tribal suits have been
successful thus far. The twenty-one Northwest Tribes won their
fishing rights case regarding Washington State culverts, but
Tribes have not yet been successful in opposing the Dakota Access
Pipeline crossing under Lake Oahe, and the Native Village of
Kivalina did not win its climate change lawsuit either.
But, by filing these lawsuits, Tribal governments are
communicating in very specific ways how environmental quality
matters in these communities: to survival, to subsistence, to public
health, but also in the intimate connection of spiritual practices to
26
place.
Outside of the courts, the lawsuits have prompted greater
public dialogue over Tribal characterization of their environmental
injuries, as well as their claims to greater environmental rights.

24. The Rosebud Sioux and Fort Belknap Indian Community also filed suit in
September 2018, challenging the presidential permit granted to build the Keystone XL
pipeline through eastern Montana, the Dakotas, and Nebraska. See Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Dep't of State, No. 18-cv-00118-BMM (D. Mont. filed Sept. 10, 2018) (arguing that government action should be set
aside as violating the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Historic
Preservation Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act, among other things).
25. United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017), affd by an equally
divided court, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018).
26. Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Examining Tribal Environmental Law, 39 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 42, 47-48 (2014).
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Because of these lawsuits, we have seen more discussion of why
and to whom environmental quality matters. That's taken place in
the popular press, to be sure, but also on the floors of the House
and the Senate.27
B. Cities
Cities, too, are significant new entrants into environmental
litigation. 28 In the 1980s, municipal entities, particularly
significantly-sized cities, began more often to take their grievances
to court, bringing public nuisance claims against manufacturers of
tobacco and asbestos, firearms, lead paint, and opioids for harm
both to the city and to their communities. 29 In the last several
years, municipalities have expanded their efforts into the
environmental arena. For example, New York City and numerous
other cities brought tort claims against Exxon, along with other
fuel additive manufacturers, for contamination of drinking water
supplies with the additive MTBE.30 These claims were largely
successful and the cities recovered millions of dollars in
31
settlements and judgments.
As of 2019, the City of Seattle and other municipalities are in
court with public nuisance and other claims against Monsanto, the
27. E.g., 162 CONG. REC. H7065-01 (2016) (statement of Rep. Gabbard); 162 CONG.
REC. S6598-01 (2016) (statement of Sen. Hoeven); 162 CONG. REC. S6505-07 (2016)
(statement of Sen. Reid).
28. Cities appear to have filed substantially more citizen suits after 2000 than before.
In April, 2019, I ran the query, ti(city) and "citizen suit" and (pollution or environment!), in
the Westlaw database of federal district opinions, both published and unpublished. The
search yielded 338 opinions. I reviewed these individually, locating opinions in seven citizen
suits total filed by cities in the 1970s and 1980s, compared with eight citizen suits filed by
cities in the 1990s, twenty-five suits filed from 2000 to 2009, and sixteen suits filed between
2010 and 2018. This data is merely impressionistic, since not all citizen suits filed by cities
may have resulted in opinions in the Westlaw database, and my search may have
underrepresented suits filed by municipal entities titled, for example, "village" or similar.
The search also did not include common law tort claims or claims for, say, cleanup liability
under the Comprehensive Environment Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. Nonetheless, along with the public nuisance cases described in the
text, the search results strongly suggest an overall rise in environmental litigation brought
by city plaintiffs.
29. See generally Kathleen S. Morris, Cities Seeking Justice: Local Government
Litigation in the Public Interest, in How CITIES WILL SAVE THE WORLD: URBAN INNOVATION
IN THE FACE OF POPULATIONS FLOWS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 189,
201 (Ray Brescia and John Travis Marshall eds., 2016) (arguing that cities are "units of
representative democracy").
30. E.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65, 84 (2d Cir.
2013) (tort claims included product liability claims, negligence, nuisance, and trespass).
31. E.g., Reuters, Oil Companies Settle MTBE Pollution Suit, N.Y. TIMES (May 7,
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/07/business/rtoil.html (reporting a settlement of
$423 million); Mireya Navarro, City Awarded 105 Million in Exxon Mobil Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009 (reporting a jury award of $104.7 million over MTBE contamination of
groundwater).
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American manufacturer of PCBs, to hold it responsible for cleaning
up PCB contamination of waterways and drainage systems in
those cities. 32 They are alleging that Monsanto's promotion and
sale of PCBs to numerous consumer product manufacturers
essentially made waterway contamination inevitable.
Finally, Oakland, San Francisco, and New York City filed suit
in 2017 against five of the largest petroleum conglomerates for
damages on a public nuisance theory. 33 The cities are arguing that
even as the major oil and gas companies raised the decks of
offshore platforms and changed the design of facilities in the
warming Arctic to stave off the risks of climate change, they
continued to promote the sale of petroleum products widely to the
public. Their products, of course, were made to be combusted and
greenhouse gas emissions were the inevitable result.
New York City in particular has pointed out its vulnerability to
34
sea-level rise due to its long coastline and its large flood plain. It
is now spending billions on "climate resiliency," including elevating
facilities and streets and waterproofing infrastructure such as its
subway system. 35 All the cities are seeking damages to cover the
costs of adapting to climate change. New York City, of course, is
litigating on behalf of its population of 8.6 million; San Francisco
and Oakland on behalf of a population of over a million combined.
The cities are in court on behalf of the health and welfare of their
residents, as well as the city's own territory.
C. Youth
Juliana v. United States is a climate change lawsuit with a
bold set of claims. It was filed in 2015 by twenty-one "youth
plaintiffs," now ages 11 to 22, against the federal government. In
the Julianacase, the youth plaintiffs are arguing that the federal
government has failed in its responsibility to them to carefully
32. E.g., City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1096 (W.D. Wash. 2017). So
have the City of San Jose and others. E.g., City of San Jose v. Monsanto Co., 231 F. Supp.
3d 357 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Washington State appears to have filed its own claim. See Gene
Johnson, Washington State Suing Agrochemical Giant Over PCB Pollution, WASH. POST
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.comlnational/health-science/washington-statesues-monsanto-over-pcb-pollution/2016/12/09/e914b59c-be7c- 11e6-91eeladddfe36cbestory.html?utm term=.9ce40396e596.
33. See City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2018),
appeal filed (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2018); City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal filed (2d Cir. July 26, 2018).
34. See generally Amended Complaint
64, City of New York v. BP, p.l.c. et al, No.
18-cv-00182-JFK (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 16, 2018).
35. New York City has launched a $20 billion program in "climate resiliency,
including constructing levees and sea walls, elevating facilities and streets, and
waterproofing and hardening infrastructure." City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp.
3d 466, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal filed (2d Cir. July 26, 2018).
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manage coastal areas and the atmosphere consistent with its
obligations under the public trust doctrine, as well as that the
federal government has violated the plaintiffs' rights to a stable
climate, a right the youth plaintiffs are asking to be recognized as
a constitutional right. They are asking that the court both
overturn federal actions, including some particular federal
authorizations related to export of liquefied natural gas ("LNG"),
and order the federal government to implement an "enforceable
national remedial plan" regarding greenhouse gases that will at
least "stabilize" the climate system. 36 Juliana was originally
scheduled for trial on October 29, 2018, but in November, 2018, the
district judge certified her orders to the Ninth Circuit.37 Julianais
the most prominent of numerous lawsuits filed by youth plaintiffs,
including actions in Alaska, Florida, Massachusetts, North
38
Carolina, and elsewhere.
Like many more typical environmental lawsuits, this group is
represented by an NGO, Earth Guardians. But it is distinctive
because although it is not styled as a class action, the youth
plaintiffs are in court as a group seeking to put a human face not
only on their generation, but on the interests of future generations.
The plaintiffs mention climate change's impact on their own
health, life, and opportunities, but also explicitly and publicly
describe their role as representing their generation and, more
generally, young people. 39 The case may involve the first major
U.S. trial in which we can expect to see oral testimony offered
by the federal government on climate change science in an
adversarial setting and a record created under stringent federal
36. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief T 7, Juliana v.
United States, No. 15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. filed Sept. 10, 2015). Its plaintiff group also
includes the climate scientist James Hansen as a guardian for future generations.
37. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012) appears to contemplate certification of
individual orders for appeal, District Judge Aiken appears to have certified all previous
orders in the case for appeal. Order, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA, (D. Or.
Nov. 21, 2018) at 6 (order staying the case pending a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals) ("this Court... immediately certifies this case for interlocutory appeal") (emphasis
added).
38. E.g., First Amended Complaint, Reynolds v. Florida, No. 18-CA-000819 (Leon Cty,
Fl. filed Dec. 26, 2018) (seeking to enforce state's public trust obligations and constitutional
rights to stable climate). The nongovernmental organization Our Children's Trust
maintains a list of youth lawsuits pending in state court. See www.ourchildrenstrust.org/
pending-state-actions (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).
39. E.g., Sophie Kivlehan, Your View by 2017 Parkland Grad: Why I sued the
federal government over harmful air pollution, MORNING CALL (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.mcall.com/opinion/mc-climate-change-lawsuit-paris-accord-kivlehan-ithink0623-20170622-story.html ("Climate change is the biggest threat facing my generation.");
Jennifer Hackett, Kids versus Fossil Fuels: A Chat with a Teenage Activist, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/kids-versus-fossilfuels-a-chat-with-a-teenage-activist/ (Plaintiff Kelsey Juliana stated that climate change
"could have an impact on my livelihood" and that "we're arguing that the U.S. government
has betrayed its youth...").
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evidentiary standards. Overall, it's fair to say that the plaintiffs
are seeking a very high impact judicial ruling. One indicator of this
may be how hard the U.S. government is fighting this suit. The
United States filed two motions in the Supreme Court to stay
discovery and trial pending a petition for certiorari or mandamus.
Both such motions were ultimately denied, the first in July, 2018,
and the second in November, 2018.40 Nonetheless, the strong
signals of concern from the Supreme Court likely prompted the
district judge to delay the trial in order to certify her rulings for
interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit, which she did on
November 21, 2018. 41 As of April, 2019, oral argument in the Ninth
Circuit had been scheduled for June, 2019.42

III. A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE SUITS
The environmental claims in the Tribal, city, and youth suits
range widely; the plaintiffs are asserting claims based on treaties,
statutes, the Constitution, and common law. Their injuries range
from the very local to the global.
Nonetheless, there are some commonalities. First, these
plaintiffs, even though their claims may encompass injury to
themselves as governmental entities or as individuals, are also in
court overtly to represent a community or a nation. 43 The City of
New York, for example, is seeking damages both for injury in its

40. See Order, United States v. U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, No.
18A65 (U.S. July 30, 2018) (order denying application for stay) ('The Government's request
for relief is premature and is denied without prejudice. The breadth of respondents' claims

is striking, however, and the justiciability of those claims presents substantial grounds for
difference of opinion.'); Order, In re United States, No. 18A410 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2018) (order
denying stay "because adequate relief [on the mandamus petition] may be available in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit" and citing the July order's comment
that "the 'striking' breadth of plaintiffs'.., claims 'presents substantial grounds for
difference of opinion."').
41. Order, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2018)
(order staying the case pending a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals); e.g.,
Order, Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2018) (accepting appeal,
given district judge's interlocutory appeal certification, over dissent from Judge Friedland
that district judge's findings did not appear to indicate that district court was "of the
opinion" that interlocutory appeal would materially advance the litigation's termination but
instead indicated that it was "compelled" to issue the certification).
42. See Order, Julianav. United States, No. 18-36082 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2019).
43. E.g., Amended Complaint T 15, City of New York v. BP, p.l.c. et al, No. 18-cv00182-JFK (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 16, 2018). ('The City is responsible for the public health,
safety, and welfare of its more than 8.5 million residents and the millions of additional
people who work in or visit New York City each day.').
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proprietary capacity and injury to its community. 44 The complaint
of the twenty-one Juliana plaintiffs claims that they aim to
"represent the youngest living generation." 45
Further, these plaintiffs are arguing to expand our
understanding of environmental injury. Tribal plaintiffs are
focusing attention on losses to ways of life from degradation of
waterbodies, as in the Dakota Access Pipeline challenges and
salmon treaty rights claims; other plaintiffs are arguing that
injury risks need to be taken more seriously, such as a greater risk
of injury from extreme weather events and other anticipated
climate-related changes. Those latter arguments are being made in
the municipal cases against oil companies and in the youth cases,
including Juliana,on behalf of future generations.
And perhaps predictably, given the evolving nature of
environmental challenges combined with the relative stasis in
federal environmental statutes, the plaintiffs are often advancing
legal claims that seek to move both statutory and common law
toward greater environmental protection.
Consider the Tribal claim in the treaty rights case involving
Washington State's culverts. The twenty-one Tribes were seeking
to enforce the Stevens treaties of 1854 and 1855, which
"guaranteed 'the right of taking fish . . in common with all
citizens of the Territory."' 46 They succeeded in arguing that the
right was broad enough to bar the State of Washington from
taking action such as building the so-called barrier culverts that
interfered with salmon reproducing and contributed to the decline
in salmon population. This was so even though the Ninth Circuit
found simply that the barrier culverts had a negative effect upon
the salmon population, rather than finding that the State's
affirmative purpose was to reduce the salmon available to the
Tribes. 47 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit with an

44. New York is asserting injury in its proprietary capacity, e.g., id. 12 ('The costs of
these largely unfunded projects [to protect public health and safety and City property and
infrastructure] run to many billions of dollars and far exceed the City's resources."), as well
130 (describing harms from defendants' conduct as including
as to the community, id.
"injuries to public health resulting from more frequent and more intense heat waves and
flooding.').
It is worth observing that some cities also are environmental defendants-perhaps for
sewage treatment or waste disposal violations. In these instances, suits brought by cities
may represent efforts to seek contribution.
96, Juliana v.
45. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
United States, No. 15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. filed Sept. 10, 2015) ('Youth Plaintiffs represent
10 ('This Court is
the youngest living generation, beneficiaries of the public trust."); id.
Plaintiffs' last resort to ensure their reasonable safety, and that of our Posterity, from the
harm perpetrated by Defendants.').
46. United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2017).
47. Id. at 956-66.
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equally divided vote despite concern expressed by eleven States
that the ruling would enable other treaties to be "expanded to
48
create wholly new rights."
The municipal public nuisance lawsuits also seek an expansive
understanding of common law nuisance doctrine. The prototypical
environmental public nuisance case involves the large industrial
plant that spews soot into the air and onto neighboring properties;
the air emissions interfere with the public use and enjoyment of a
shared resource, and most courts would agree that this amounts to
a public nuisance. 49 In the municipal cases, though, the cities want
the courts to recognize an expanded notion of proximate causation.
Seattle is arguing that Monsanto has created a public nuisance not
by dumping PCBs into the waterways directly, but by promoting
and selling PCBs to makers of a wide array of consumer products
then used in Seattle. Even though the conduct was legal at the
time, and even though Monsanto could not control what happened
to these consumer goods, Monsanto, so the argument goes, was
aware of PCB's toxicity and their propensity to leach, and its
conduct thus has "unreasonably interfered" with public use of
50
shared resources.
In the New York City, San Francisco, and Oakland cases
against the oil companies for damages from climate change, the
cities' suits are not based on greenhouse gases emitted by the oil
companies themselves. Instead, the cities are arguing that the
major oil companies' promotion and sale of fossil fuels itself should
be seen as a public nuisance-because of environmental
consequences that inevitably, and thus foreseeably, follow when
fossil fuels are purchased and then burned. 51
Plaintiffs in Juliana v. United States are also arguing to
expand the government's common law obligations. The youth
plaintiffs are arguing that the federal government has a fiduciary
48. See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Wisconsin and Wyoming In Support of Petitioner
at 3, Washington v. United States, No. 17-269 (U.S. filed Sept. 20, 2017).
49. E.g. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, 237 U.S. 474 (1915); see generally ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 73 (7th ed.

2013) ("The doctrine of public nuisance.., later expanded to embrace actions against those
who fouled public waters or emitted noxious fumes.").
50. City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1107 (W.D. Wa. 2017)
(finding that Seattle successfully pleaded causation by alleging Monsanto, the sole US
producer of PCBs, who promoted its use in a "wide range of industrial and commercial
products" also "knew that its chemicals were dangerous, and that as early as 1969
Monsanto knew that . . .'nearly all [PCBs used in highway paint]' wind up in the
environment.').
51. Amended Complaint f 80, City of New York v. BP, p.l.c. et al, No. 18-cv-00182JFK (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 16, 2018). (despite knowledge of the risks of climate change and
their sophistication, defendants "decided to continue [their] conduct and commit
[themselves] to massive fossil fuel production.").
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duty under the so-called public trust doctrine to manage shared
resources, including coastal areas and the atmosphere, on behalf of
the whole public. That duty, however, has only previously been
imposed on State governments, 52 and not with respect to the
atmosphere as yet. 53 The Juliana plaintiffs are also arguing that
the federal courts should recognize a new due process right under
the Constitution-the right to a stable climate capable of
sustaining human life. 54 These are bold claims. As noted above, the
boldness of these claims has ultimately led to the district judge
certifying her rulings in favor of the plaintiffs to the Ninth Circuit
5
for interlocutory review.6
These plaintiffs have not advocated for every imaginable
environmental value; research has not uncovered claims by these
plaintiffs to protect the existence value of a resource,5 6 for
example, or to advocate directly on behalf of a plant or animal
species. 57 Even so, these plaintiffs are bringing suits that ask the
courts to take an expansive understanding of the human
consequences associated with environmental injury.
So, what should we think of these lawsuits from Tribes, cities,
and children? They might give us pause, especially if we hark back
to Justice Marshall's comment in Marbury v. Madison, that the
"province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals."5 8 While judicial rulings obviously can have impact

52. Cf. MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE'S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW
ECOLOGICAL AGE (2013) (arguing for expansion of public trust doctrine to federal
government and to atmosphere).
53. The public trust doctrine has previously applied centrally to waterbodies, natural
resources, and parkland. E.g., In re 10 E. Realty v. Vill. of Valley Stream, 854 N.Y.S.2d 461
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008). In rejecting a motion to dismiss the youth climate change lawsuit,
Judge Aikens did not reach the atmospheric trust issue, finding it sufficient that the
plaintiffs alleged impacts on marine resources. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d
1224, 1255-56 (D. Or. 2016).
54. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 279, Juliana v.
United States, No. 15-cv-01517-TC (D. Or. filed Sept. 10, 2015) ("Our nation's climate
system, including the atmosphere and the oceans, is critical to Plaintiffs' rights to life,
liberty, and property.").
55. Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2018) (order
staying the case pending a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
56. E.g., Ohio v. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (vacating
natural resource damages assessment regulations for failure to require full consideration of
existence values).
57. Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Contemporary public concern . . . should lead to the conferral of standing upon
environmental objects to sue for their own preservation"); Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418,
424 (9th Cir. 2018) (implying availability of animal standing, as "the complaint includes
facts sufficient to establish Article III standing" for macaque monkey, though ultimately
rejecting standing on statutory grounds).
58. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803); see also Spokeo v. Robins,
136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (reasoning that standing doctrine helps '"prevent the judicial
process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches' . . . and confines the
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outside the scope of an individual case, whether through precedent
or through the relief granted, 59 and judges have the final word on
what the law requires, including of executive agencies, 6° the
argument here could be that these claims essentially seek to
vindicate the public interest by advocating for policy change, and
appeals to vindicate the public interest should be made in the
61
political arena.
The Supreme Court has sounded similar themes in cautioning
against using the courts to re-fight battles over policy preferences.
Thus, the court has suggested that large groups of people,
particularly those with diffusely spread losses, should rely on the
political process. 6 2 Taxpayer challenges are the most extreme
example; injuries are generally individually small, and taxpayer
challenges are treated as a stand-in for policy disagreement.
Thousands of taxpayers potentially can vote, and vote together, to
raise their issues in the political arena. Courts typically refuse to
hear these claims, finding that such plaintiffs lack standing to
sue. 6 3 Concern has similarly been expressed over the issuance of
federal courts to a properly judicial role." (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct.
1138, 1446 (2013))).
59. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (on nationwide injunctions); cf.
Robert F. Nagel, Controllingthe Structural Injunction, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 395, 396
(2006) ("Today federal courts control more important public decisions and institutions
[including schools, prisons, jails, mental health systems, public housing, welfare programs,
and fisheries] in more detail and for more extended periods of time than at any time in our
history.").
60. E.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 9
(1984) ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must
reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent."); Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) (Courts

"must reject administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by adjudication or
by rule-making, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the
policy that Congress sought to implement.").
61. Cf. Tara Leigh Grove, Government Standing and the Fallacy of Institutional
Injury, 167 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1, 29) (on file with William and
Mary Law School) (arguing against government assertions of harm to "their official powers
and duties" to establish standing; arguing state governments should be able to interact with
other political institutions over their prerogatives without going to court).
62. E.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (rejecting argument that
"undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law" can ever be
basis for standing.) With extraordinarily rare exceptions, for example, the courts do not take
up taxpayer grievances that government funds are being poorly, illegally, or even
unconstitutionally spent. Individual taxpayers cannot claim that the U.S. government
inappropriately contracted out security functions to Blackwater or Halliburton, for example,
or that the U.S. government isn't collecting sufficient royalties from a lease to drill for oil on
federal lands. Federal courts are of the view that even if they are collectively important,
taxpayers' individual interests in these claims may not be all that significant. Meanwhile,
taxpayers have the ability to vote-and enough potential allies in the political process-that
courts have concluded that their interests do not warrant judicial intervention.
63. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974) ("This is surely the
kind of generalized grievance [not appropriate for judicial resolution] since the impact on
[the taxpayer] is plainly undifferentiated and 'common to all members of the public."')
(citations omitted); cf. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445
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nationwide injunctions when a single plaintiff challenges
government action on the theory that the injunction provides
broader relief than to the parties to the case, 64 although many
courts accept that a decision to set aside or enjoin a particular
government action or to enjoin particular private activity can
65
legitimately benefit more than the plaintiff who brought the case.
Similarly, some scholars have criticized suits by governmental
entities to seek redress of injury to their official powers (such as
the Senate's confirmation prerogative), arguing that these claims,
66
too, belong on political turf.
An argument here could be that Tribes, cities, and children,
even if they possess specific, cognizable injuries, are in court
centrally to express frustration with or to shift environmental
policy. If so, we might question whether that debate over policy
preferences belongs in the courts. Perhaps we should encourage
these groups to take their concerns to the push and pull of the
political arena instead.
Viewing these claims circumspectly is also consistent with a
narrow view of the judiciary's institutional competence. The theory
here is that courts-particularly unelected judges-lack the
competence to decide the subtle and complex policy questions that
67
are intrinsic to assessing the soundness of government policy.
(1915) (constitutional due process requires no "direct voice" in the adoption of a generalized
rule of conduct); id. ('Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a
complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.");
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990) ("respondent cannot seek
wholesale improvement of this program by court decree") (refusing to find agency "action"
under Administrative Procedure Act); Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542
U.S. 55, 65 (2004) (relying on Lujan to find agency inaction insufficiently discrete to be
reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act).
64. E.g., Samuel Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131
HARV. L. REV. 418, 419 (2017) ("federal courts are issuing injunctions that ... prohibit the
enforcement of a federal statute, regulation, or order not only against the plaintiff, but also
againstanyone.") (emphasis added).
65. See also id. at 444 ("When courts want to grant injunctions that go beyond
protecting the plaintiffs, they point to the extent of the violation, the permissibility of
injunctions benefitting nonparties, the impracticality of giving an injunction benefitting
only the plaintiffs, and the need for complete relief.") (footnotes omitted) (also noting
counterarguments.). Judicial recognition of so-called "facial challenges" to laws or
regulations also imply the legitimacy of a judgment with an effect beyond the litigants.
E.g., Michael C. Dorf, FacialChallenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STANFORD L. REV.
235, 236 (1994) ("If a court holds a statute unconstitutional on its face, the state may not
enforce it under any circumstances"); cf. Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz,
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 682 (1989) (noting
that the core of the nonacquiescence issue is whether agency is "entirely free to disregard
binding law in the circuit" following litigation of a particular claim); id. at 683 ("we believe
that any [intracircuit] nonacquiescence that might come close to transgressing
constitutional norms would also be proscribed by nonconstitutional constraints.").
66. E.g., Grove, supra note 61 (manuscript at 1, 4) (arguing that such "government
institutions" should battle one another on political turf rather than in court).
67. Compare Richard Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, Legislative Dysfunction, and the
Public Trust Doctrine: Can Two Wrongs Make It Right? 45 ENVTL. L. 1139, 1152-53 (2015)
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Meanwhile, perhaps adjudication is not well-suited to address the
proper balance among wide-ranging and conflicting interests, such
as balancing our economic needs for natural resources against
environmental preservation.
In my view, however, there are several reasons to welcome
these claims. First off, many individuals suffering environmental
injury who would wish to enforce their rights under environmental
statutes or common law never make it to court. Even if we see such
an individual-who generally lacks recourse to the political
process-as a relatively appropriate plaintiff, the personal and
financial obstacles for individuals seeking legal redress are
substantial, despite the occasional availability of pro bono or
contingency fee counsel. 68 It seems likely that only a tiny fraction
of individuals with environmental injury ever take their claims to
court. 69 Environmental nongovernmental organizations have
helped take up the slack, but they, too, have finite resources.
Meanwhile, courts are not "self-starting;"7 0 they cannot take up
potential legal violations or difficult issues unless someone files a
lawsuit first. Litigation brought by Tribes, cities, and children may
not be a perfect substitute for individual claims. The governmental
entities or other plaintiffs may not raise precisely the same claims
or be able to seek exactly the same relief as an individual; relief
sought might be either broader or narrower. But environmental
injury is typically not particularly focused; consequences can be
widespread. Numerous individual residents in Seattle who cannot,
as a practical matter, bring suit may nonetheless face risks from
PCBs in the waterways and may benefit from the City of Seattle
acting as a plaintiff. In short, claims of the sort I am describing
sometimes can be proxies for individual claims, much like citizen
suits to enforce the laws. They can enable courts to hear claims of
environmental legal violation or to hold the federal government
71
accountable for complying with the law.
(arguing that courts possess "neither the competency nor the legitimacy" for environmental
policy), with Alfred T. Goodwin, A Wake-Up Call for Judges, 2015 Wis. L. REV. 785, 788
(2015) (reasoning that "the third branch must now recognize its obligation to provide a
check on government exercise of power over the public trust.").
68. E.g., Alexandra Lahav, The Political Justification for Group Litigation, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3193, 3200-01 (2013).
69.

Cf. ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 51 (2017) (reporting that a

medical malpractice study found that a claim was filed in under 2% of cases in which there
was negligence indicated in New York hospital records).
70. Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
21, 21 (1996).
71. See Lahav, supra note 68, at 3200-01. Municipalities may be unable to sue States
without state law authorization. E.g., City of Trenton v. N.J., 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) ("A
municipality is merely a department of the state, and the state may withhold, grant or
withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit. However great or small its sphere of action, it
remains the creature of the state exercising and holding powers and privileges subject to the
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Second, these groups may have few other options to address
environmental threats. Although Tribes and cities have a genuine
stake in their territory and in governing their communities, they
have limited direct regulatory power over environmental quality.
As the Supreme Court commented regarding States in
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, Tribes and
municipalities also cannot invade neighboring States or negotiate
foreign agreements. 72 And both because damaging conduct can
take place outside their boundaries and because regulatory
authority is mostly located in States and the federal government,
most municipalities and Tribes have a very limited ability to
7
regulate harmful environmental conduct directly.
Third, even if the political process may be an option for some
entities, such as State governments, it is not especially welcoming
for children, cities, or Tribes. This is more than a matter of
ideology. Whichever party is in control of federal and state
legislatures, well-funded, well-organized interest groups seem to
be dominating political dialogue. But consider the youth plaintiffs
in Julianaand the broader community of youth affected by climate
change and environmental degradation. Of course, our children
cannot vote, and neither can our children's children. 7 4 Even if
parental votes take children's future welfare into account, that
may be only one factor informing those votes.
Municipalities also face distinct obstacles to relying on political
safeguards. State governments dominate the communication of
preferences on the national stage, and they tend to over represent

sovereign will.") (citation omitted); see also Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.
1979).
72. See Massachusettsv. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007).
73. Tribes may apply for EPA approval to administer certain limited provisions of
federal environmental laws. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA'S DIRECT
IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2016),

https://www.epa.gov/tribal/epas-direct-implementation-federal-environmental-programsindian-country. Even that authority may face opposition. See, e.g., Richard A. Monette,
Treating Tribes as States under Federal Statutes in the Environmental Arena: Where Laws
of Nature and Natural Law Collide, 21 VT. L. REV. 111, 111 (1997) (explaining that despite
some federal statutes authorizing EPA to permit Tribes to regulate as States, "states and
their citizens . . . challenge the EPA's authority to recognize tribal governance over them
and their property."). Municipalities also may be restricted from directly regulating
environmental issues. E.g., Richard Whisnant, State Versus Local Government Power to
Regulate Environmental Problems in NC, ENVTL. LAW IN CONTEXT (Apr. 13, 2016),
https: einc.sog.unc.edu/state-versus-local-government-power-to-regulate-environmentalproblemsin-nc/.
74. Selected jurisdictions now authorize youth to register to vote before the age of 18
and even to vote in a primary, but they must still be 18 years of age to participate in general
elections. See generally NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, PREREGISTRATION

2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and(Feb. 12,
FOR YOUNG VOTERS
campaigns/preregistration-for-young-voters.aspx.
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the views of people living outside municipalities. 75 Representation
in Congress tends to be more responsive to States than to
municipalities, even though lawmakers may assert they represent
local constituencies. 76 And as a number of scholars writing in local
government law have observed, "our federalism" is not good for
municipalities, even though most Americans live within
metropolitan statistical areas. 77 The stronger regional or State
governments, the less latitude municipalities have to respond to
local preferences. 78 Finally, most people who live in poverty also
live in cities, worsening the problem of underrepresentation. 79 41%
of those in poverty live inside the limits of principal cities; 84% of
80
those in poverty live inside metropolitan statistical areas.
Tribes, too, are poorly positioned to rely on the political process
to respond to Tribal members' needs and policy preferences. In
addition to the ethnic and race-related prejudice they may face,
Tribes represent some of the poorest communities in the country.
Native Americans have the highest poverty rate of any racial or
ethnic group in the U.S.81 Tribal members are subject to some of
the same voter disenfranchisement efforts that have plagued
people of color across the country.82 Thus, contrary to the
75. Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1188
(2018) ("The problem for American cities is exacerbated by a state-based system that favors

rural over urban jurisdictions.').
76. Id. at 1186 ("numerous elected officials--in statehouses and in Congress--can
validly assert that they represent locals, even as they do not represent the city as a whole");
cf. Opinion, America Needs a Bigger House, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/1 1/09/opinion/expanded-house-representativessize.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage; Opinion, A Congress for Every
American, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/201811/10/
opinion/house-representatives-size-multi-member.html.
77. 86% of the U.S. population resides within metropolitan statistical areas; 32%
reside inside the limits of "principal cities." KAYLA FONTENOT, JESSICA SEMEGA, & MELISSA

KOLLAR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2017, at 12
(2018).
78. Schragger, supra note 74, at 1186; Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 35-36, 39-40 (2002). But see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good
for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J. L. & POL. 187, 191-95, 210
(2005).
79. Cf. Laurence E. Norton, II, Not Too Much Justice for the Poor, 101 DICK L. REV.
601 (1997).

80. FONTENOT, supra note 76, at 12.
81.

See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, POVERTY RATE BY RACE/ETHNICITY (2017)

https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/poverty-rate-by-raceethnicity/?currentTimeframe=
0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited
Feb. 17, 2019) (reporting poverty rate of 22% among American Indian/Alaska Native
ethnicity, higher than any other ethnicity tracked).
82. In the fall of 2018, North Dakota passed legislation requiring a street address
to register to vote, even though tens of thousands of North Dakotans, particularly
Native Americans, lack street addresses and use post office boxes for their mail. Maggie
Astor, A Look at Where North Dakota's Voter ID Controversy Stands, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/us/politics/north-dakota-voter-identificationregistration.html.
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assumptions courts make in rejecting "generalized grievances,"
Tribes, cities, and children cannot readily rely on direct regulatory
powers or the political process.
By the same token, these entities may find their interests
inadequately represented in State or federal enforcement. At the
time of writing, in 2019, federal enforcement of environmental
laws seems especially unlikely.8 3 But even during administrations
more receptive to environmental enforcement, institutions
responsible for enforcement must pick and choose among a
national array of potential cases, balancing a wide range of
concerns. Enforcement priorities may not be developed in any sort
of representative way or even be particularly transparent.8 4 In
short, going directly to court is one of the few tools that Tribes and
cities have to respond to the needs of their communities---or to
express their position on what their environmental legal rights
should be.
Yet another reason to welcome these plaintiffs is their
institutional advantage in identifying environmental injuries,
especially compared with federal agencies and national
organizations. Tribes and cities have an on-the-ground
relationship with residents. They are often uniquely placed to spot
environmental injuries, whether those are reports of illness,
drinking water problems, or fumes. In 2014, for example, the City
of St. Louis, Michigan collected reports of dead blackbirds and
robins in people's backyards. That signaled significant soil
contamination with DDTs from a nearby chemical plant site that
had already undergone one Superfund cleanup.8 5 In turn, the
community was able to argue for more extensive cleanup at the
site.
And as we know from environmental justice advocates,
environmental impacts vary. Environmental injuries are not
uniform across the country or even across states. They vary across
geographic areas and among communities. Climate-related
impacts on coastal Florida will be different from inland impacts.
Environmental hazards are often concentrated in poor urban
neighborhoods; southwest Detroit is among the nation's most
83. E.g., LEIF FREDRICKSON ET AL., ENVTL. DATA & GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, A
SHEEP IN THE CLOSET: THE EROSION OF ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA (2018),
https:H//envirodatagov.org/publication/a-sheep-in-the-closet-the-erosion-of-enforcement-at-the
-epa/.
84. See also Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1031, 1093 (2013) ("because presidents have not claimed responsibility for supervising
enforcement in a sustained and transparent way, accountability is limited.").
85. E.g., Editorial, Dying Birds & Poisoned Soil: The Toxic Legacy of St. Louis,
PLANET EXPERTS, (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.planetexperts.com/dying-birds-poisoned-soiltoxic-legacy-st-louis.
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hazardous areas for residents.8 6 Tribes and cities, and, in some
instances, children are in a position to detect these distinct
environmental harms, particularly those accumulating gradually,
and to speak for injured populations who are not receiving very
much attention elsewhere.8 7
Further, Tribes and cities are likely to speak well for their
communities' needs and preferences because they are constituted
by their obligation to respond to community concerns and to care
for their residents.8 8 Although cities are located within States,
people may feel as great an affinity for their city-or even
greater--compared to their connection with their State or country.
So when cities become "Plaintiff cities," as Sarah Swan terms
them, that is partly because cities are so closely connected with
their distinct communities.8 9 When the government of the Rosebud
Sioux Tribe files suit, as it has against the federal government for
authorizing the Keystone Pipeline to carry oil through the Midwest
from the Alberta tar sands, it is both speaking for and accountable
to its community of 35,000 members who may be unified
geographically, culturally, or both.9 0 Their positions in litigation
are likely to be informed by dialogue within their communities.
Owing to the demographics of these communities and their
place in our political system, it also is worth underscoring that
Tribes, cities, and youth plaintiffs are all likely to give a greater
voice to viewpoints of the poor and disenfranchised compared with
individual or even State government plaintiffs. 91
Moreover, these entities are democratically accountable for the
decisions they make, including in litigation. Tribes and cities
cannot rush off to court at will. Litigation is not cheap, even if
Tribes and cities are fortunate enough to have access to pro bono
or reduced rate legal assistance. They typically do not file lawsuits
86. E.g., Hannah Stephanz, The Need to Fight for Michigan's Dirtiest Zip Code,
EARTHJUSTICE (Aug. 11, 2014), https://earthjustice.org/blog/2014-august/the-need-to-fightfor-michigan-s-dirtiest-zip-code (noting that southwest Detroit is Michigan's dirtiest zip
code and the country's third dirtiest).
87. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748
(2005) ("Disaggregated institutions create the opportunity for global minorities to constitute
local majorities."); see also Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1232
(2018) (describing the ability of plaintiff cities to litigate over public health harms with high
impacts on minority and vulnerable populations or characterized by a slow accumulation).
88. E.g., Morris, supra note 29, at 201.
89. Swan, supra note 87, at 1257-58; Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the
FederalistEmpire, Anti-federalism From the Attack on Monarchism to Modern Localism, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 74, 97-98 (1989); Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Associational Standing for
Cities, 47 CONN. L. REV. 59, 76 (2014).
90. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief q14, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. U.S.
Dep't of State, No. 18-Cv-00118-BMM (D. Mt. filed Sept. 10, 2018) ("Rosebud provides for
the health, safety, and welfare of its members . . . Rosebud has almost 35,000 members,
many of whom reside in the area that will be crossed by the Pipeline.').
91. See Morris, supra note 29; Gerken, supra note 87.
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until there has been considerable internal deliberation within
Tribal and city governments. Meanwhile, elected officials
92
supervise those lawsuits.
Because of these characteristics, Tribes and cities may possess
important advantages over individual plaintiffs, both in when they
choose to sue and in the content of the arguments they make.
Indeed, Lemos identifies the typical primacy of individuals in
litigation as a "bug" in the system of litigation; they and their
lawyers can shape policy, but without "authorization [from] or
accountability [to]" the broader public whose interests may be
affected.9 3 Further, democratic accountability is not typically a
feature of nongovernmental organizations, as important as they
are in monitoring governmental action and representing interests
94
that fare poorly in the political process.
Finally, let's turn back to the youth plaintiffs in cases such as
Juliana. They are not democratically accountable. 95 But these
individual plaintiffs see themselves as taking on the obligation to
speak for a large and distinctive group that has not, so far, been
able to speak for itself. And they naturally have a longer time
horizon than many of us; they seem able to make the interests of
future generations relatively less abstract and more concrete in
our public dialogue on the environment. That the plaintiffs have
expressly claimed this role may prompt them to be more publicly
engaged with the views of others.
There is no guarantee of victory in these lawsuits. But even if
these plaintiffs ultimately lose their lawsuits, they still gain some
important benefits. Litigating is a critical opportunity for
underrepresented groups to participate in the broader public
92.

Kathleen S. Morris, San Franciscoand the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local

Public Law Offices, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC

INTEREST ADVOCACY 51, 62 (Columbia University School of Law Attorneys General Program
and Yale Law School Liman Public Interest Program 2010) ("The courts, the city budget
process, the press, and the people (via elections) serve as rigorous checks" on litigation
decisions.) The idea for the lawsuit may not have originated with the city, but this is little
different from any process of government decision making that draws on ideas from a wide
range of sources. See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC
POLICIES (2011).

93. Margaret Lemos, Three Models of Adjudicative Representation, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
1743, 1749-51 (2017) (identifying challenges for litigation when individual may not wish to
raise claims serving broader constituency).
94. The Supreme Court put a stop to early environmental group efforts to assert
broader environmental interests in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See id. at
736 (refusing to find standing for environmental group attempting to assert broader
interests in the area's aesthetics and ecology and rejecting arguments that the Sierra Club's
"longstanding concern with and expertise in [the use of natural resources] were sufficient to
give it standing as a 'representative of the public."').
95. Perhaps because the relief they seek would necessarily benefit others similarly
situated, this suit also has not been styled as a class action. Cf. Lemos, supra note 93
(discussing advantages of private class actions).
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dialogue. These groups are presenting proof of their environmental
injuries and their arguments about rights and obligations to
a governmental institution that is obligated to serve the public.
The Juliana case, for example, has received significant news
coverage, 96 and may have made it more likely that environmental
policy makers will engage more directly with the interests of
future generations.
Similarly, the Standing Rock Sioux and the Cheyenne River
Sioux's lawsuits over the Dakota Access Pipeline have sharply
raised the visibility of their environmental concerns. Appearing in
the federal courts, they have obtained an opportunity to articulate
their rights and to seek answers from the government. Even
though the Tribes have not so far succeeded, they also have drawn
their environmental injuries to the attention of other decisionmaking bodies.
One more benefit from the lawsuits: litigation is a way to open
important information in control of one side to the public. 97 If the
Juliana case makes it to trial, for example, it will be the first
major litigation in which the government will have to present its
view of climate science in court and face questioning on that view.
So ensuring that Tribes, cities, and children have their day in
court is, of course, critical for them.
But at least as critical, in my view, is that the emergence of
these plaintiffs groups is likely to improve judicial decision
making. Chief Justice Roberts characterized judging as, more or
less, calling balls and strikes. 98 That metaphor was never terribly
persuasive, given the number of difficult, unsettled legal questions
regularly making their way to court, but it certainly doesn't typify
environmental cases. First, especially at the present moment,
environmental litigation is shot through with difficult questions.
Courts must consider the implications of newly recognized forms of
environmental harm and an emerging understanding of what
causes that harm. Meanwhile, courts handling environmental
litigation also must contend with dated federal environmental
statutes that are often phrased in vague terms as well as new
96. E.g., Miranda Green and Timothy Cama, Overnight Energy: Supreme Court
declines to stop kids' climate lawsuit, THE HILL (July 30, 2018) https://thehill.com/policy/
energy-environment/overnights/399588-overnightenergy-supreme-court-refuses-to
stopkids; Fred Pearce, Meet the 'climate kids' suing the US government over global warming,
NEW SCIENTIST (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23931910-500meet-the-climate-kids-suing-the-us-government-over-global-warming/.
97. E.g., Alexandra Lahav, The Political Justification for Group Litigation, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3193, 3197 (2013).
98.

See U.S. COURTS, CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS STATEMENT - NOMINATION PROCESS,

www.uscourts. gov/educational-resources/educational-activites/chief-justice-robertsstatement-nomination-process (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
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arguments to broaden common law obligations. Whatever their
qualifications on such matters, judges simply cannot avoid
addressing questions of policy and value left unresolved in earlier
common law rulings or the statutes they are applying. 9 9
Second, to state the obvious, judicial rulings often have impact
far beyond the litigants in the case, including through precedential
effect for common law rulings or statutory interpretation. 10 0 In
environmental cases in particular, because the government or a
major private actor is so often involved, the ruling itself can have
impacts far beyond the individual litigants, whether it is a ruling
setting aside a federal agency action or imposing a regional or
nationwide injunction.101
At the broadest level, take the federal constitutional question
of standing to sue. Current doctrine calls on the judiciary to
determine which environmental values are significant enough so
that injury to them entitles a plaintiff to be heard-to assert a real
"case or controversy" justifying Article III jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs claims. 10 2 Courts may be influenced by statutes in
deciding these questions, 0 3 but typically legislative actions have
effectively been treated as suggestive rather than governing. For
example, courts may find a plaintiff has standing when the
plaintiff has suffered lost property value, illness, lost recreational
opportunities or aesthetic enjoyment, or injury to some forms of
spiritual value, 0 4 but not stigma from the denial of equal
99. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalismand the Limits of Reason,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1507 (2007) ("[A]s compared to courts, legislators plausibly have
better information than judges about the factual components and causal consequences of
their constitutional decisions.").
100. E.g., Lemos, supra note 93.
101. Id. at 1746; e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (setting aside EPA's
decision not to issue Clean Air Act endangerment finding for automotive greenhouse gases);
South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959 (D.S.C. 2018)
(enjoining Trump Administration delay of the Obama Administration "waters of the United
States" Clean Water Act rule); Ariel Wittenberg & Amanda Reilly, Judge shifts legal brawl,
revives WOTUS in 26 states, E&E NEWS (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060094329.
102. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992) ("standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article 11r').
103. Despite comments in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife that Congress may "elevat[e]
to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously
inadequate in law," deciding which injuries are sufficiently concrete to warrant standing
remains an enterprise closely linked to the common law. 504 U.S. at 57. See, e.g., Cass
Sunstein, What's Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 'Injuries," and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 167 (1992) (the injury-in-fact requirement of standing "injects common
law conceptions of harm into the Constitution" and is "inevitably a product of courts' valueladen judgments and of governing legal conventions"). But see William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988) (arguing that "standing should simply
be a question on the merits of plaintiffs claim").
104. See generally 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3531.8 (3d ed. 2018).
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treatment unless the equal treatment has been personally
denied, 10 5 nor the prospect of lost future recreational opportunities
unless the location of loss can be precisely identified. 10 6 Like
common law rulings, these rulings typically cite earlier judicial
7
precedent rather than statutory enactments or any other source.1 0
Statutes also often do not speak in a detailed fashion to core
legal questions, leaving it to the courts to delineate environmental
rights and obligations in their opinions. For example, consider the
National Environmental Policy Act, which requires government
entities to perform environmental analysis prior to taking action.
NEPA requires discussion of "the environmental impact" of the
proposed government decision, but Congress did not further
specify the content of those decisions in the statute's text.10 8 The
Council on Environmental Quality NEPA regulations that could
have further delineated the sorts of impacts to the natural world
which must be considered are remarkably nonspecific. 109 It thus
has fallen on courts to make the final decision on which
"environmental impacts" must be considered. 110
Similarly, in tasking the EPA with deciding whether power
plant mercury emissions warrant regulation, the Clean Air Act
asks the agency to assess "appropriate[ness]" of such regulation. It
was the Supreme Court that finally decided that statutory
language authorizing "appropriate" regulation requiredthe EPA to
consider cost at that early phase.1 1 '
105. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (so holding despite observing that "this sort of noneconomic
injury is one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government action').
106. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009).
107. E.g., id. at 492 (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-12 (1983)); Allen,
468 U.S. at 755 (citing Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984)); Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983)).
108. See National Environmental Policy Act, 43 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (2012)
(requirement that analyses include discussion of "the environmental impact" of the proposed
government decision); see also 43 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2012) (NEPA goals include federal
coordination in order to "assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings").
109. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14-1502.16 (2018) (governing agency preparation of
environmental impact statements); see generally Richard W. Revesz, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY 859 (3d ed. 2015) (noting that CEQ preambles suggest that agencies need not
consider economic and social effects alone).
110. E.g., Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 769
(1983) ("psychological health damage [to nearby residents] and serious damage to stability.
• . of the neighboring communities" from reopening Three Mile Island nuclear power reactor
not within the impacts agency was required to consider in environmental impact statement;
"[t]ime and resources are simply too limited for us to believe that Congress intended to
extend NEPA [this] far").
111. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015). As it did in Michigan, the Supreme
Court has increasingly interpreted statutes to ensure that cost is among the issues an
agency considers in regulating. E.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009)
(permissible for agency to interpret "best available technology" statutory language to
require it to consider cost); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457,
490 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("... other things being equal, we should read silences or
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In sum, courts resolving environmental claims very often must
assess new questions under dated, generally phrased statutes,
whether those cases are brought by individuals or groups. Because
of the dynamic nature of environmental harm and our
understanding of it, statutes do not identify every environmental
problem that needs a solution. The issues posed to courts often
involve questions of value. Moreover, most federal pollution control
statutes do not preempt more protective state law; they mostly
operate as a "floor" of environmental protection and allow States to
go further, including through common law.11 2 In part that is a
recognition that States may prefer more environmental protection
1 13
and that federal pollution statutes have gaps.
So common law claims, both state 14 and, in some instances,
federal,11 5 remain a vital source of environmental legal obligations.
Inevitably, the courts are facing the challenge of figuring out how
common law should be adapted to address new environmental
injuries.1 1 6 For example, a court hearing a claim under the very old
ambiguities in [statutory language] as permitting, not forbidding" the consideration of
adverse effects, including cost, of regulation).
112. E.g., Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, FederalPreemption and Clean Energy Floors,
91 N. C. L. REV. 1283, 1298 (2013) (discussing floor preemption in multiple pollution
statutes and stating that it "allows a minimum level of regulation ... and provides an
option for states and localities so inclined to undertake the additional cost of still better
environmental quality").
113 Id.
114. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Clean Water Act not to preempt state
common law claims as long as the common law of the source state is applied. International
Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987). Whether the Clean Air Act specifically
preserves state common law is a little less settled. Although the Supreme Court held that a
federal common law nuisance claim in which the plaintiffs sought emissions abatement was
displaced by federal statute, see infra note 115, the Second, Third and Sixth Circuits have
found state common law claims not preempted by the Clean Air Act. See Bell v. Cheswick
Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 2013); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
Prods. Liab. Litig. 725 F.3d 65, 96-103 (2d Cir. 2013); Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply,
805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2015). Some district courts have disagreed. See Comer v. Murphy Oil
U.S.A, 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 865 (S.D. Miss. 2012).
115. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915) (applying federal
common law to state nuisance claim). The courts have found some federal common law
claims displaced when federal statutes regulate the issue. For example, the Court has held
that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is displaced by "the
more comprehensive scope" of the Clean Water Act. See also City of Milwaukee v. Ill. &
Mich., 451 U.S. 304, 311 (1981). See also Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. 410
(2011) (displacement question is whether the federal statute, specifically the Clean Water
Act, "speaks directly" to the issue at hand-emissions of carbon dioxide from the defendants'
plants); Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 696 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding
that federal common law nuisance claim for damages also displaced by Clean Air Act).
Nonetheless, the federal courts possess residual authority in some instances to develop
federal common law. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 313.
116. And in the setting of climate change, two federal judges have found state common
law claims completely preempted by federal common law, although they then concluded that
the Clean Air Act displaced those federal common law claims. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C.,
325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal filed, No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. Sept. 4,
2018); City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal filed,
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doctrine of public nuisance must assess not only whether there is
an "interference" with public resources, but also whether that
interference is "unreasonable." Our understanding of those issues
necessarily must evolve as we understand new notions of what
counts as shared resources and new sources of environmental
harms, and as we consider whether such harms are justified by
associated public benefits.
As noted, Seattle and other cities are calling on courts to find
public nuisances around PCB contamination of waterways. Seattle
won the first round against Monsanto, largely succeeding in
convincing the court that public nuisance doctrine can encompass
the relatively long chain of causation that underpins Seattle's
claim. 117 In the New York City, Oakland, and San Francisco cases
against oil companies, those cities have lost the first rounds
against the major oil companies who, the cities allege, created a
public nuisance by promoting oil and gas in a warming world. The
district judges in those cases acknowledged the difficulty of finding
that the oil and gas companies unreasonably interfered with the
use and enjoyment of public resources given the public benefit
from fossil fuel combustion. 118 The cities are appealing, however,
and other suits are pending. 119
The Juliana case also raises difficult legal questions. In that
case, the courts must decide whether the federal government must
No. 18-cv-182-JFK (2d Cir. July 26, 2018) (regardless of how complaint is framed, "the City
is seeking damages for global-warming related injuries resulting from greenhouse gas
emissions, and not only the production of Defendants' fossil fuels'). The complete
preemption rulings are controversial, since typically such rulings focus on congressional
intent and since the rulings in these cases are in tension with the "venerable rule that the
plaintiff is the master of her complaint." See Gil Seinfeld, Climate Change Litigation in the
Federal Courts: JurisdictionalLessons from California v. BP, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 25,
27 (2018).
117. City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1096 (W.D. Wa. 2017); this is one
of 12 municipal and State suits over PCB contamination that was pending during 2018.
E.g., Gary Smith & Casey Clausen, West Coast "Super Tort" PCB Suits Have Staying Power,
LAW360, Mar. 7, 2018, https://www.law360.com/articles/1019286/west-coast-super-tort-pcbsuits-have-staying-power (municipalities are alleging "special injury," while States are
bringing suits in the States' parens patriae capacity). Although earlier city suits were lost,
many of the plaintiffs in the recent suits have been convincing courts that PCB discharge to
waterways was "inevitable." Id.
118. E.g., City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1023 ("wYithout those fuels, virtually all
of our monumental progress would have been impossible. All of us have benefitted ...Is it
really fair, in light of those benefits, to say that the sale of fossil fuels was unreasonable?
This order recognizes but does not resolve these questions. . . ."); City of New York, 325 F.
Supp. 3d at 466 ("As an initial matter, it is not clear that the Defendants' fossil fuel
production and the emissions created therefrom have been an 'unlawful invasion' in New
York City, as the City benefits from and participates in the use of fossil fuels as a source of
power, and has done so for many decades.").
119. Baltimore has a case in Maryland state court; San Mateo County has a claim in
California state court. E.g., County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting motion to remand to state court), appeal filed (9th Cir. Mar. 27,
2018).
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manage public resources subject to a common law trust obligation
and whether that obligation extends to the atmosphere. The courts
also must consider whether to recognize a new constitutional right
to a stable climate. Thus far, the trial judge has ruled in favor of
the new constitutional right and the federal common law trust
obligation but held only that the trust obligation extends to the
waters.
Across the range of environmental cases, courts are confronting
challenging legal issues such as whether the Clean Water Act
covers discharges to groundwater or certain wetlands, 120 to what
extent the Clean Air Act authorizes regulation of particular
greenhouse gas sources, 12 1 and to what extent federal permits
122
foreclose claims based on state environmental standards.
As courts resolve all these claims, they must address whether
and how the law-broadly phrased statutes, tort claims, public
trust doctrine, and constitutional claims-needs to evolve. For
many reasons, we find it desirable to insulate judges from direct
political pressure, but the fact that unelected judges resolve these
types of claims has given rise to criticism.1 23 Even elected judges
are not electorally accountable in quite the way that legislators
are. But as courts take up these questions, they inevitably must
decide questions of environmental obligation and, in so doing,
allocate the associated benefits and burdens. Such rulings cannot
avoid resolving questions that strongly resemble those facing
agencies or even legislatures. Thus, although Tribes, cities, and
children are by no means the only environmental plaintiffs around,
they are, by design or by commitment, responsive to broadly held
interests; their perspectives accordingly ought to be particularly
valuable to courts.
IV. CONCLUSION

The rise of environmental litigation brought by Tribes, cities,
and children should be seen as a welcome development. I alluded
earlier to Justice Marshall's statement that courts serve mainly to
vindicate the rights of individuals under the law. The participation
of representative groups in environmental litigation is a direct
challenge to that notion. Groups such as Tribes, cities, and
children can, through litigation, raise the visibility of particular
120. E.g., Hawai'i Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018), cert,
granted, County of Maui v. Hawai'I Wildlife Fund, No. 18-260 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2019).
121. E.g., West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2015) (litigation over

Clean Power Plan; currently stayed).
122. E.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Fola Coal Co., 845 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2017).
123. E.g., Lazarus, supra note 67.
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environmental injuries and prompt us to appreciate their
potentially broadscale nature in a tangible way. Such plaintiffs can
usefully provide the courts with a more representative and
democratic perspective on the significance of environmental
injuries. And in general, when such parties can widen the range of
views heard in court, judges seem likely to reach more carefully
reasoned, better decisions on these difficult claims.
While a detailed proposal is beyond the scope of this essay, it's
worth identifying at least a few implications. First, courts might
consider treating both city and Tribal claims of standing with
"special solicitude," as the Supreme Court did for the State of
124
Massachusetts in recognition of its "quasi-sovereign" interests.
As discussed above, Tribes and cities might be understood
to possess interests similar to States in the "health and well-being
...of [their] residents," interests they are often unable to protect
through unilateral action. 125 Moreover, in view of their democratic
and deliberative credentials or, in the case of the youth plaintiffs,
their representative commitments, courts should take very
seriously these plaintiffs' arguments to recognize new forms of
injury related to environmental harm. Those arguments could
relate to issues ranging from constitutional standing to the scope
of statutory environmental analysis requirements under the
National Environmental Policy Act. 26 Finally, judges might pay
particular attention to arguments made by Tribes, cities, and
children as they assess what should count as "unreasonable

124. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). Courts have not fully resolved
whether municipal and Tribal standing claims are entitled to "special solicitude." E.g.,
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F. 3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013) (treating
Tribal standing claim with special solicitude); Center for Biological Diversity vs.
Department of the Interior, 563 F.2d 466, 477 (D.C.Cir. 2009) (assuming arguendo that
Point Hope Native Village was sovereign entitled to "special solicitude," but then rejecting
standing on the ground that Point Hope was asserting only "derivative effects on Point
Hope's members," rather than impacts on Point Hope's owned territory); Canadian Lumber
Trade Alliance v. United States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (mentioning but
deferring judgment on the question of whether Tribes are entitled to "special solicitude");
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 882 (N.D. Cal. 2009),
aff'd on other grounds, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that plaintiff Native Village
was not entitled to "special solicitude" and lacked standing on basis of inadequate
causation); City and County of San Francisco v. Whitaker, 357 F. Supp.3d 931 (N.D.Ca.
2019) (finding no special solicitude for city standing claims).
125. Cf. Alfred L. Snapp & Son., Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)
(discussing the requirements for a State action in parens patriae and noting that quasisovereign interests can be understood to include interests a State might, if it could, seek to
address through its own lawmaking powers).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 108-110 (discussing NEPA analysis issues).
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interference" with public resources in nuisance cases, or what
should constitute valid public uses of shared resources in public
127
trust cases.
In other words, we should cheer the sight of these plaintiffs
converging on the courts. Their lawsuits do not solely indicate an
abstract disagreement on policy, the sort that belongs in a political
debate-though they can signal that too. Instead, we should
understand these suits as a valuable step to ensure that important
voices are not effectively silenced or drowned out in a national
discussion, to draw our attention to some of our most significant
environmental injuries, and ideally to prompt us to develop better
solutions that protect both the environment and the people who
depend on it.

127. E.g., Arno v. Commonwealth, 930 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 2010) (public trust doctrine
requires that any legislative transfer "must be for a valid public purpose ... and private
benefits must not be primary but merely incidental").

